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The Effects of Foreign Aid on
Income Inequality
Tim Layton

Abstract
This article furthers the research on the inability offoreign aid to address the economic
needs of receiving states, particularly in the area of income inequality. We hypothesize that
foreign aid is distributed and used in ways that worsen inequality. Additionally, we predict
that foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than democracies. While not
contradicting any existing theories on the causes of income inequality, our theory shows that
foreign aid may act as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases

inequality. The newly developed database offoreign aid loans (PLAID) provides data on the
independent variable, and the Gini coefficient is used as the measure ofthe dependent variable.
In addition, we control for eight separate causes of income inequality. The study includes
two panel datasets including 169 observations from twenty:four countries. To account for
limitations in the DLS, we used a Feasible Generalized Least Squared (FGLS) model. The
results suggest that a highly substantive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality,
although the efj(!Cts may be subject to endogeneity. Holding all things constant, this .finding
shows that while aid may help the poor, it clearly benefits the rich more.
Introduction
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of literature criticizing the current methods
for giving foreign aid. There is an abundance of literature that suggcsts the foreign aid money
the West gives to the developing world is limited in its effectiveness (Easterly 2006; Boonc
1996; Easterly 1999; Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 19n). Other scholars continue to argue that
foreign aid is effective, but only under the right conditions (Burnside and Dollar 2000; Hansen
and Tarp 200 I; Collier and Dollar 200 I; Nunnenkamp 2005). All ofthese studies use economic
growth to determine the etTectiveness of foreign aid. A few researchers have approached the
question of what other effects of foreign aid exist, such as its effects on quality oflife (Kosack
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2003), but research on many areas affected by foreign aid remain rclativcly untouched. One of
these areas is the effect of foreign aid on income inequality in the developing world.
Scholars agree that income inequality is detrimental to economic growth in the developed
world (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson and Tabellini 1994). Robert Barro concluded
that the growth-retarding effect of income inequality is greater in poor countries (2000).
In democracies with majority rule or in autocracies wherc the people have some influence,
if the mean ineome exceeds the median income, redistribution occurs. The redistributive
policies retard growth in those economies (Alesina and Rodrik 1994). Inequality also causes
sociopolitical unrest (Alesina and Perotti 1996). Income inequality has been directly linked
to a reduction in happiness levels, as well (Blanchflower and Oswald 2003). This reduction is
greater among those at lower income levels and those with less education. As a result, the poor
begin to commit crime, fonn riots, and participate in other disruptive activities (Barro 2000:
Pastor 1995; Alesina and Perotti 1996). This increase in unrest hurts the economy and, more
importantly, decreases the quality of life of all people in the country, especially those without
the means to protect themselves.
Because of the detrimental economic, political, and sociopolitical effects of inequality, it
is important to understand what causes differences in inequality in various countries around
the world. Much of the developing world experiences some degree of inequality, but some
countries suffer less from economic differences. Why do these differences exist? How do
some countries escape extreme inequality, while others experience a rift between the rich and
the poor that increases in size every day? [n this paper, we theorize that one of the causes of
inequality in the developing world is the foreign aid money that the West sends in an attempt
to reduce the rift between the rich and the poor. We contend that economic growth is not the
only important factor to examine when detennining the effectiveness of foreign aid. [f aid does
increase economic growth but also increases inequality, then the goal of that aid (to reduce
poverty) is not met. The aid may also have a rcvcrse effect by increasing inequality, which then
retards growth. It is important to understand this relationship so that aid organizations may
better detennine the effectiveness of their efforts.

Review of Existing Inequality Literature
Thc study of income inequality has produced a limited amount of literature that addresses
the question of what causes changes in inequality. The literature that does exist provides a
list of socioeconomic and sociopolitical causes that fall into four related but distinct camps:
political explanations, international integration explanations, macroeconomic explanations, and
demographic explanations. Each of the camps emphasizes a particular category of independent
variables as causes for changes in income inequality. There is some overlap between the camps,
as some of the theories do not refute, but rather add to, the theories of the other camps.

Political Explanations
The political explanations camp focuses on four political causes of change in income
inequality: social spending, democracy, public sector expansion, and legislative partisan political
power distribution. Rudra and Huber et al. found that social spending must be divided into
education spending, health spending, and social security/welfare spending in order to see the true
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LAYTON
effects of each type of spending (Rudra 2004; Huber et al. 2006). Rudra found that only education
spending decreases inequality. She contends that social security and health spending are subject
to greater lobbying and clientelism. Huber et al. found that health and education spending have
no effect on income inequality; this finding may be due to their use of an aggregate measure that
combined the two variables into one. Huber et al. and Rudra also found that social spending
increases inequality, yet Huber et al. made this conclusion in the context of non-democracies.
This phenomenon occurs because social spending only aids those employed in the formal sector
who are usually the political elite in non-democracies.
Several studies looked into the effect of democracy on inequality (Reuveny and Li 2003;
Huber et al. 2006; Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985). While Bollen and Jackman
concluded in 1985 that democracy has no effect on inequality, several recent studies have
reversed that conclusion, the most recent of which (Huber et al. 2006) showed that the strength
of the democratic tradition is one of the best explanatory variables for changes in inequality in
Latin America (see also Muller 1988). Reuveny and Li also made the interesting conclusion
that democracy decreases inequality when interacted with globalization, a variable that will
be discussed later. Lee also studied the effect of democracy on inequality but in the context
of public sector expansion, concluding that public sector expansion in non-democracies
increases inequality. In non-democracies, the state supports particular core industries and
client populations, which causes this inequality increase. This does not occur in democracies
where the political mechanisms allow the state to help meet the needs of the lower classes
(Reuveny and Li 2003).
Another political factor that affects inequality is the "legislative partisan political
power distribution." Huber et at. (2006) concluded that in Latin America, countries with
strong histories of left-leaning legislatures have lower inequality (see also Mahler 2004).
Their conclusion pointed to the idea that income inequality may actually be reduced by
political means.

International Integration Explanations
The second camp of scholars is made up of those that believe factors dealing with
international integration explain changes in income inequality. There seems to be a consensus
in the literature that foreign direct investment and trade both increase inequality (Alderson and
Nielsen 1999; Evans and Timberlake 1980; Reuveny and Li 2003; Gustafsson and Johansson
1999). The idea is that the money that comes into a country through FDI and trade goes to the
sector where the country has a comparative advantage, increasing incomes in that sector while
leaving all other sectors of the economy in the dust. Reuveny and Li did suggest that when trade
is interacted with democracy, it actually decreases inequality. As previously stated, this occurs
because a democracy allows a country to meet the needs of the poor.
Macroeconomic Explanations
The third group of scholars
macroeconomic factors best explain
inequality falls into this camp. This
Kuznets Curve, an upside-down U

is mostly made up of economists who believe that
changes in inequality. The original theory about income
thcory suggests that all countries are somewhere on the
(Kuznets 1955; Alderson and Nielson 1995; Robinson
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1976). Kuznets suggested that incomc inequality in countries increases as the country develops
(defined as increases in per capita income) and then dccreases after it reachcs a critical point.
Much of the literature on inequality seeks to explain why this curve exists, because most
economists do not accept changes in per capita income as an adequate explanation.
Samuel Morely put forth several additional macroeconomic explanations for inequality in
Latin America. He claimed that inflation increases inequality bccause it hits the poor harder than
the rich (Morcly 200 I; Albancsi 2007; Bulir 200 I). The rich can invcst in capital or land when
inflation occurs, and these investments do not decrease in value with infiation. The poor, however,
cannot do this because such a large percentage of their income goes toward consumption. Morely
suggested that recessions also increase inequality because they hit the poo'r harder than the rich
(Morely 1995; Psacharopoulos et al. 1995). Recessions cause unemployment, usually at the
low end of the income bracket. They also cause the rich to spend less on the goods and services
that the poor provide, decreasing the income of the poor and increasing inequality. Morely's
final explanation for inequality was change in the minimum wage (1995). He suggested that a
decrease in the minimum wage leads to more formal sector jobs, decreasing inequality, and that
an increase in the minimum wage leads to fewer formal sector jobs, increasing inequality.

Demographic Explanations
The final group of scholars explains changes in inequality using dcmographic variables. The
most prominent theory in this camp is that an increased youth population increases inequality
(Simpson 1990; Bollen and Jackman 1985; Gustafsson and Johansson 1999). Young people
have less experience and are more often unemployed. They also provide a competitive pool
for employers to draw from, decreasing the wages of the youth and increasing the profits of the
employers. Huber et al. suggested that the effect on inequality of the youth population actually
decreases inequality, but only insignificantly. This finding is interesting, yet not well explained.
Morely suggested that the real explanation for inequality is not in the size of the youth population
but rather in the dependency ratio, the number of workers compared to the size ofthe family they
are supporting (1995).
Another demographic variable that helps explain changes in inequality is the percent of
the population employed in the informal sector (Huber 2006 et al.; Gustafsson and Johansson
1999; Alderson and Nielsen 1995; Nielsen 1994). The literature concludes that a higher
percent of the population employed in agriculture (high sector dualism) increases inequality
because wages are often lower in the informal sector, and the workers do not receive much of
the benefit of government social spending through social security and welfare programs.
Another demographic factor that affects income inequality is cthnic divcrsity. Therc are
certain levels of ethnic diversity or racial diversity that cause large discrepancies in income
distribution (Meisenberg 2007). When political leaders come from a particular race or ethnic
group, they tend to reward that race or ethnic group. In his article, Bayart listcd African
dictators who diverted money to tribe mcmbers (1992). This tendency to divcrt funds to the
leader's ethnic group leads to inequality; as one group is prefcrred over others, that group
obtains better jobs, government contracts, and higher income.
The final demographic explanatory variable is education. Most scholars argued that
education decreases inequality over time (Lce 2005; Morely 1995; Alderson and Nielsen
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1995; Crenshaw 1992). Education allows the poor to escape poverty and obtain jobs that pay
better wages. Widespread education also attracts widespread foreign direct investment, not
just FDI in certain sectors, but in all sectors where there are educated individuals.
Our theory that foreign aid affects changes in inequality falls into the international
integration explanation camp. Although foreign intervention through foreign aid is not the same
as intervention through trade and FDI, it still involves foreign powers or organizations investing
money into an economy. The differences are that aid organizations invest this money through the
governments of the developing countries, and the goal of the money is to improve the welfare
of the poor instead of to gain profits. The foreign aid theory does not contradict any of the
established theories about the causes for changes in income inequality. Instead, it seems that
foreign aid money acts as a catalyst for many of the established theories about what increases
inequality. Aid is used by developing countries to fund various programs that increase inequality:
education spending, health spending, social security/welfare spending, public sector expansion
in non-democracies, FDI attraction, trade liberalizing, and economic growth. Because foreign
aid supports these inequality-increasing programs, it should lead to increased inequality itself.

Why Foreign Aid Leads to Inequality
Several mechanisms describe how foreign aid money leads to an increase in inequality.
All of the mechanisms play some role in the process of aid money flowing to certain groups
and away from other groups.
The first causal mechanism exists through politics. As rational actors, politicians act to
please their supporters. Often, a politician's supporters are made up of a group of high-income
private citizens with special interests. The politicians have a vested interest in pleasing their
supporters so that the supporters help them win subsequent elections, pay living expenses, and
find employment after several faithful terms in public office. In his study on the effectiveness
of foreign aid, Boone concluded that all political systems favor a "high-income political elite"
when it comes to aid distribution (Boone 1996). He divided countries into three groups: those
with elitist governments, egalitarian governments, and laissez-faire governments. From his
evidence, he concluded that all three government types favor the high-income political elite.
Since the governments are the organizations that ultimately control how aid money is used,
it can be assumed that the money is distributed in a manner that favors those high-income
individuals who support the politicians in office. This increases the incomes of a small group
of individuals, including the politicians and their supporters, but leaves the poor essentially
in the same position before the government received the aid money, leading to an increase in
income inequality. Even if the government decides to give equal amounts of aid money to the
poor and their supporters, income inequality increases because the money given to the poor
has to be distributed among a large group. The money given to the supporters is distributed
among a much smaller group, allowing each individual to receive a larger share. Easterly
claimed that governments also have little incentive to increase the productive potential of the
poor because this might foster political activism that would threaten the politicians' and their
supporters' social and political standing (Easterly 2003).
Some argue that the conditionalities aid agencies include in loans and grants are designed
to force governments to use aid in ways that benefit the poor. The conditionalities often require
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a liberalization of economic policies (which mayor may not help the poor) and improvements
in institutions. Over the last several decades, these conditional ities have been under attack
because of ineffectiveness, lack of enforcement, and lack of credibility (see Bauer 1993; Collier
et al. 1997; Leandro et at. 1999; Morrissey 2004; Svensson 2000). The conditionalities force
unwanted policies on unwilling governments. Because of this, the governments find ways to
get around the conditionalities. Sometimes they do not fully implement the policies, sometimes
they repeal the policies as soon as they get the money, and sometimes they refuse to implement
the policies and count on the benevolence of the aid organization to induce the giving of the
loan or grant without the conditionalities. Because of these problems with aid conditionalities,
the money still goes to the high-income political elites, increasing inequa·lity.
This might, however, still decrease inequality if these high-income individuals would
invest the money in the domestic economy. An increase in investment could cause economic
growth by increasing the number of jobs and the amount of credit available to all members of
society. Commonly referred to as a "trickle down" effect (Azam and Laffont 2003), this effect
does not fully occur unless the money is invested domestically, which seldom occurs (See
Easterly 1999 and Boone 1996). Investors in poor countries favor foreign markets for several
reasons. Investments in developing economies may provide more opportunity for profit, but the
associated risk often encourages local investors to look abroad. Globalization has facilitated
international investment and expanded investment choices, enabling a broader and more stable
portfolio. In cases wherc the trickle down effect does occur, inequality continues to increase
because the political elite continue to receive the majority of the funds.
The aid organizations' selection process for giving aid causes another disincentive
for politicians to improve the welfare of the poor. Logically, aid organizations make
decisions based on the needs of the poor, giving aid to those nations whose poor need it.
If the welfare of the poor improves, the aid money will eventually slow. For this reason,
the governments that receive aid money have little incentive to actually help the poor; if the
welfare of the poor docs not improve, the aid money will keep coming (Svensson 2000).
Bauer claimed that the problem is that aid goes to governments whose policies retard growth
and create poverty (1993). These countries have an incentive to keep their institutions from
improving; more economic crises means an increase in aid money (Azam and Laffont 2003).
The improvement of institutions is crucial to decreasing inequality because better, more
democratic institutions allow the government to meet the needs of the poor (Reuveny and Lee
2003). Better institutions and governance could also decrease inequality by redistributing
income through effective taxation and by decreasing the influence of the high-income
political elites through crackdowns on corruption.
International aid-giving organizations arc also subject to the interests of their member
states (Nielson and Tierney 2003), giving a new incentive to the politicians in aid-receiving
countries. If they want to receive aid, they nced to encourage programs that cause the member
countries of the aid organizations to give them aid, suggesting that the developing country is
more likely to use the money to improve its standing with the donor countries than to help the
poor. This causes an increase in income inequality because the money is spent on programs
that favor the elite that arc well connected with the West, rather than those programs that aid
the lowest income groups.
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For a moment, let us assume that aid money does actually get through the government
and is invested wisely in the domestic economy. It is logical to assume that the aid is directed
to the sector that has the highest potential to generate profits and, thus, has a potential to cause
economic growth. If the money is directed to these sectors, the owners of those sectors profit
most. The workers in those sectors should profit some as well. While the other sectors probably
experience some growth due to the success of the highly profitable sector, the growth is much
less pronounced. This causes an increase in income inequality because, while the incomes
of the members of the specified sector rise significantly, other incomes remain unchanged or
increase insignificantly.
Foreign aid can also affect inequality through the ethnic diversity hypotheses listed in the
literature review. If the political leaders who distribute the aid money belong to a particular
ethnic group, they tend to prefer that ethnic group when distributing foreign aid. They use the
aid to make sure the members of that ethnic group receive better-paying jobs. They also use
the money to directly improve infrastructure in the areas where members of their ethnic group
reside. Since the literature has established that ethnic diversity tends to lead to inequality, we
add to that literature by suggesting that one way that this relationship exists is through the
distribution of foreign aid.
From this theoretical discussion we extract two hypotheses: I) foreign aid will lead
to income inequality, and 2) foreign aid will cause more inequality in autocracies than
democracies. We suggest that this increase in inequality is caused by aggregate aid. It may
be the case that some aid programs actually decrease inequality, but the goal of this study
is to discover the effect of net inflows of foreign aid money. We hypothesize that most
of the aid distributed in the form of projects that are meant to decrease inequality is not
spent in the way that is desired by the donors. The aid is often used for other purposes that
actually increase inequality. Because of this misuse of aid and the other natural effects of
aid mentioned in our theoretical framework, we hypothesize that the net impact of aid on
inequality will be positive: foreign aid increases inequality. We used aggregate aid as our
dependent variable because of its availability and because it is the measure of aid most
frequently used in foreign aid literature (see Burnside and Dollar 2000, Hansen and Tarp
200 I, Easterly 2003).
Data Collection
The dependent variable of this study is the Gini index of income inequality. It was provided
by the United Nations' University World Inequality Database, WilD (UNU-Wider 2005). This
database provides quality ratings and other information for each ofthe observations. Following
the methods of Huber et at. (2006), we filtered the data in order to obtain the most valid
observations. First, we deleted those observations with expenditure, consumption, earnings,
or market income as the measure of income. Second, we deleted all observations that did not
include data for the entire population. The observations were given a quality rating of 1, 2, or
3, 3 being the lowest and I being the highest. We eliminated all observations with a quality
rating of 3. In many cases, there remained several observations for the same year. When this
occurred, we deleted all cases that used the household or family as the unit of analysis. Where
multiple values still existed, we deleted any observation with the quality rating of 2. A few
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multiple year observations still remained, so we averaged the remaining values. This process
yielded a dataset with valid observations and one observation per year.
There is much contention over the use of the Gini coefficient as a measure of inequality.
It may not provide the most valid measure for this variable, but it is the measure with
the most available data. Because of the high level of availability in comparison to other
measures of inequality, we decided to use the Gini coefficient as our measure of inequality
for this study. The vast majority of scholarly articles in the field of inequality research have
also used this measure.
Unfortunately, the data on the Gini coefficient while much more prevalent than other
measures of inequality, is limited. For most countries, the Gini coefficient is not available
for multiple consecutive years. Because of this limited availability of data, our datasets were
limited in their inclusion of countries and years. However, we did include all of the countries
and years possible in our analysis.
Data for our independent variable, foreign aid, comes from a newly developed comprehensive database of foreign aid loans and grants called the Project-level Aid Database
(PLAID) (Brigham Young University 2007). PLAID is a database currently under construction by Brigham Young University and the College of William and Mary. The project has been
funded by the National Science Foundation and is currently under consideration for further
funding from the Gates Foundation. Its database contains bilateral and multilateral loans and
grants to all countries across the world since 1970. While the database is still under construction, the data it provides is more complete than any other data source for foreign aid inflows
because it includes data from the OEeD and the World Bank. We use aggregate foreign aid
data for each country each year there is a Gini coefficient. The aggregate data is obviously
less descriptive than disaggregated. In fact, it is possible that some types of aid may decrease
inequality. Upon the completion of the PLAID database, we will run further tests to determine
which types of loans cause income inequality to increase and which types cause income inequality to decrease. Nevertheless, this aggregate study should reveal the overall net effect of
foreign aid on income inequality. We expect this relationship to be positive because recipient
countries use this aid at their own discrction. Aid money intended for income equalizing programs may be misused, as our theory predicts. Wc followed the trend in the current literature
by using an aggregate aid database.
Our study also includes several independent variables established in the literature to allow
us to understand the effects of our independent variables after controlling for the explanatory
variables that scholars have established. Summary statistics for these variables, along with our
independent and dependent variables, appear in Table 1. Following the table are theoretical
explanations for including each of the control variables.
Inflation
Several authors agreed that inflation promotes inequality. Morley argued that labor markets
lag when adjusting to high inflation (200 I, 72). This lag causes a decrease in real wages, which
hurts minimum wage workers proportionately more than other workers. The IDB (1998) and De
Ferranti et at. (2004) suggested that hyperinflation has strong effects on inequality. We agreed
with these authors and hypothesized that inflation increases income inequality. To measure
42
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Table 1: Summary Statistics for Model Including Agricultural Employment
Variable

N

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Gini Coefficient

169

!'(7S45

.4764

7.9914

9.7739

Agricultural Employment

169

27.6317

8.5415

14.8644

43.6666

Youth Population

169

22.8479

15.0327

I

66.7

FDI Net Inflows

169

3190000000

7070000000

0

43800000000

Inflation (GDP Deflator)

169

90.6111

312.5484

-23.4789

2509.465

Ethnic Diversity

169

.4116

.2419

.007

.859

Polity Democracy Scores

169

5.515

5.5152

-7

10

Log Foreign Aid

169

20.5092

1.3323

13.6523

1023.1212

Polity X Log Foreign Aid

169

3.75112

.2972

3.1224

4.1865

inflation, we use the World Bank's World Development Indicator's measure of inflation, the
GDP deflator (WDI 2005).

Education
The literature suggested that education also has an effect on inequality. As a country
becomes more educated, more people obtain meaningful employment. This increase in
employment causes inequality to decrease. Measures for education are plentiful, but many
of those measures are unavailable for countries and years in our sample. Because of this, we
chose to use the most widely available measure of education, the literacy rate (WDI 2005).
Youth Population
The argument that inflation hurts unskilled workers is extended to the variable of
demography. The youth population is one of the principal suppliers of unskilled labor. Many
authors made a link between youth population and income inequality. Alderson and Nielsen
argued that a large youth population causes an oversupply of unskilled workers, thus driving
down the wage of unskilled labor (1999). Therefore, we expect that a high youth population
increases inequality. For this data we used the World Bank's World Development Indicators,
WDI (2005). This dataset provides a percentage of each nation's population younger than
fifteen years. We used this percentage as the measure of youth population in a society.
Agricultural Share o/GDP
There were differing views regarding employment in agriculture and its effects on
income inequality. Alderson and Nielson argued that decreasing proportions of employment
in agriculture increase inequality, based on the assumption that inequality in the agricultural
sector is lower (1999). Huber et al. argued the opposite for Latin America. They found that the
Gini index in urban areas suggests less inequality than in rural areas (2006). Thus, increased
employment in agriculture leads to greater inequality. Because of the limited availability of data
on employment in agriculture, we used the World Bank's WDi (2005) to obtain the agricultural
share of GDP. We used this data as the measurement of employment in agriculture.
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Ethnic Diversity
Some literature argued that ethnic divisions create more inequality. Oe Ferranti ef al.
(2004) argued that this inequality is better explained by differences within ethnic groups instead
of between them. However, we predict that countries with higher levels of ethnic diversity
have more inequality. People seck to elect politicians from their same ethnic group, and these
politicians return favors to people of their ethnic group. This promotes income inequality along
ethnic lines. We used the Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization index, ELF (Roeder 200 I), as the
measure of ethnic diversity. The ELF index is an estimate ofthe probability that any two people
in a population will belong to the same ethnic group. The data supplied a probability value for
the years 1961 and 1985. We selected the 1985 value because it is more relevant to our research.
We expected those countries with a lower value in the ELF index (more ethnically diverse) to
have more income inequality.
Democracy
Many theorists agree that democracy provides institutions that empower the poor. This
provides more opportunity for redistribution mechanisms. As the level of democracy increases,
politicians are more responsive to the needs of the citizens. Thus, one would expect that
democracy would decrease inequality. The empirical data has been ambiguous in many studies,
but Reuveny and Li (2003) found a significant relationship between democracy and inequality
when controlling for trade openness. We agreed with Reuveny and Li and hypothesize that our
model will yield a negative relationship between the level of democracy and income inequality.
We used data from Polity IV as a measure for democracy (CIDCM 2004). The Polity IV dataset
provides a measure of democracy and a measure of autocracy. The sum of these two measures
is the polity score.
GDP per capita (PPP)
The dominating theory regarding economic development and income inequality is
Simon Kuznets' (1995) inverted U-shaped curve. At lower levels of development, income
inequality increases as per capita income increases. At higher levels of development,
income inequality decreases as per capita income increases. In our dataset, we focus on
countries that receive foreign aid. It is safe to assume that most of these countries are at
lower levels of development, so we predict that per capita GOP growth increases income
inequality. Our measurement of per capita GOP (Purchasing Power Parity) comes from the
WDI (2005) data.
FDI-Percentage ofGDP
Many authors agreed that the inflow of foreign direct investment has a positive effect on
inequality. Reuveny and Li found this to be the case for a sample of countries from around the
world (2003). Tsai found that this effect of foreign direct investment on inequality is region
specific (1995). Huber et al. hypothesized that FOI increases inequality in Latin American
and the Caribbean because this type of investment applies to capital-intensive industries that
provide relatively few jobs (2006). However, the jobs provided are relatively well paying.
For this variable, we usc the WDI to determine foreign direct investment as a percentage of
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GOP (2005). We used the percentage of GOP that comes from FDI because only net inflows
of FOI that make up a significant portion of the country's GOP, not just high inflows of FDI,
should afIect inequality.

Other Variables
In our literature review, several additional variables were mentioned. The first of these is
social spending. Both Huber et al. (2006) and Rudra (2004) suggested that social spending has
a positive impact on inequality in developing countries. The logic behind this effect is sound,
but the results seem questionable. When deciding whether or not to include this variable, we
weighed the cost of losing a large number of cases due to holes in the social spending data
against the benefit of including a slightly significant control variable. We decided that the cost
outweighed the benefit and left out the variable.
Huber et al. (2006) also found that the legislative partisan political power distribution
has an effect on income inequality. We would have controlled for this variable, but we could
not obtain the data required. However, the variable only became extremely significant after
controlling for the interaction between democracy and social spending. Since we could not
include the social spending variable, we determined that our results would not be harmed by
omitting the legislative partisan political power variable.
The final variable omitted from our study was the minimum wage. Morely (1995)
suggested that a high minimum wage tends to increase inequality because of its effect in
causing a lower number of people to be employed in the formal sector.

Methodology
To test the relationship between foreign aid and income inequality (Gini coefficient),
we used two unbalanced panel datasets. The first dataset omits a control variable, percent of
total employed population employed in agriculture, because of its limited coverage throughout
the time period. The second dataset includes the agricultural employment variable but has a
smaller sample size. We ran tests on both datasets to test for the robustness of our results across
difference sample sizes and different control variables.
Model I (omitting agricultural employment) includes 211 observations from twentynine developing or transition countries from 1975 to 2002. The countries included in the first
dataset are: Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, China, Colombia, Ecuador, EI
Salvador, Estonia, Greece, Guatemala, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Malaysia, Mexico,
Moldova, Paraguay, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Post-Communist Russia, Slovenia, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Venezuela. Modcl 2 (including agricultural employment) includes 169
observations from twenty-four countries from the same time period as the first dataset. The
countries included in the second dataset are the same as those included in the first dataset minus
Bangladesh, Belarus, Moldova, and Sri Lanka. We selected countries and years based on the
availability of Gini coefficicnts in the WIDER database. We also selected the countries based
on the availability of key control variables. The lack of inequality data was problematic, but
we made make due with what was available. Because of data availability problems, this group
docs not represent a truly random sample of devcloping and transition countries. As is evident
in the lists of countries, there are no African countries in the sample. The results of this study,
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then, cannot necessarily be generalized to developing African nations. However, the sample does
include a fair number of eountries from Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America,
allowing for some generality of the results of this study throughout those regions.
Attempting to estimate regression models from panel data presents several problems
that must be addressed. First, with most panel data, the errors produced by ordinary least
squares (OLS) regression models exhibit strong heteroskedasticity-that is, there is not
constant variance across the error terms. Heteroskedasticity causes OLS to use incorrect
standard errors when producing t statistics for thc coefficients. Normally, this problem may
be corrected for by using robust standard errors that provide the correct t statistics for the
coefficients. However, heteroskedasticity also causes the OLS estimators to be poor linear
unbiased estimators. This problem can also be corrected, and we will discuss our method
for doing so below. The second problem that occurs whcn using OLS to estimate a model
using panel data is correlation between the error terms (autocorrelation). Autocorrelation
often occurs in panel data bccause of the time-series nature of the data. The errors are not
independent of each other because they rely somewhat on the errors that precede them.
Autocorrelation also causes OLS estimated t statistics to be invalid and OLS estimators to
be poor linear unbiased estimators. Because of these violations of key assumptions ofOLS,
certain strategies must be used to allow for the best estimation of the models.
There are several ways to overcome the problems of au toe orrelation and heteroskedasticity.
but it would first be wise to test for the existence of the two violations of OLS. In order to
test for serial correlation between the errors, we used a Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in
panel data (Statacorp 2007). For Model I, the test suggested that we could reject the hypothesis
of no first order autocorrelation with 90 percent confidence. For Model 2, the test suggested
that we could reject the same hypothesis with 99.9 percent confidence. Because of the high
probability that autocorrelation exists, we corrected for this problem. In order to test for
heteroskedasticity, we first ran a generalized least squares (GLS) regression (which we will
discuss more in depth later) allowing for heteroskedasticity. Secondly, we ran the same GLS
regression forcing homoskedasticity. We then used the results to run an LR test to determine the
statistical significance of the restriction placed on the model; in other words. we tested to see if
the models were significantly different when allowing for heteroskedasticity and when forcing
homoskedasticity. The LR tests for both models produced results suggesting that we could reject
the hypothesis ofhomoskedasticity in the original model with 99.9 percent confidence.
Because we found that the OLS model for our data exhibits both autocorrelation and
heteroskedasticity, we must transform the model to obtain maximum likelihood estimators
and valid t statistics. There are several ways to transform panel models to correct for these
problems. We chose to use a feasible generalized least squares (FGLS) model because it does
a fairly good job of correcting for these problems. OLS assumes constant variance among the
error terms and an absence of covariance between the error tenns, but we have shown that
these assumptions are invalid for our models. An FGLS model transforms the OLS model by
multiplying the dependent variable, the independent variables, and the error terms by the square
root of a matrix n that is equal to the quantity a 2C, where a 2 is an unknown constant and C is a
known G x G matrix where G is equal to the number oflinear equations involved in the model, or
the number of countries (Wooldridge 2002). Because C is usually unknown in GLS estimation,
46

LAYTON
FGLS estimation is used to estimate it. When !1 is used to transfonn the model, FGLS produces
estimators that are consistent, unbiased, and of minimum variance. The transfonnation also forces
the variance/covariance matrix to have constant variance down the diagonal and zero covariance
in the upper-left and lower-right portions of the matrix. This variance/covariance matrix produced
by the transfonned model now complies with the OLS assumptions ofhomoskedasticity and no
autocorrelation. Because of this, the t statistics are valid and the estimators are the best lUlbiased
linear estimators. According to Wooldridge, the FGLS model also complies with the first
assumption ofOLS, nonnality, because the transfonnation causes the model to be asymptotically
nonnal, providing completely robust estimators (Wooldridge 2002).
The FGLS model still makes several strong assumptions, however, that could cause
problems for the model. The FGLS model assumes that the effects of the independent variables
on the dependent variable are equal across all of the countries and time periods. We would hope
that this is the casc, but it is possible that it is not. The FGLS model also uses a zero conditional
mean assumption [E(u,IX) = 0] which implies that every element of Xi and ui are lUlcorrelated
where u, represents the error tenns. This assumption may also be violated, but we hope that it is
not. Other models may do a better job of providing the best linear unbiased estimators without
making such "heroic" assumptions as FGLS. A preferred model is the Seemingly Unrelated
Regressions model. While this model may provide better estimators, it requires larger samples
than those which are available to us within each unit (country). Because of this, a Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions model is infeasible. However, despite the possible violation of the FGLS
assumptions, according to Wooldridge, "the FGLS is more efficient than any other estimator that
uses the orthogonality conditions, E(Xu) = 0" (Wooldridge 2002). Because of the efficiency of
the FGLS estimators, we have chosen to model our data using a FGLS model.
Other problems may exist with our model because of a possible difficulty with endogeneity.
It is possible that income inequality causes foreign aid payments rather than the other way
around. This problem could be overcome by including a lagged dependent variable on the right
side of the equation, making an autoregressive model; however, the extreme lack of data on the
dependent variable prevents us from including a lagged dependent variable. In the future, we
may attempt to control for this problem by using software to impute past values. We also hope
that the availability of income inequality data will improve in the future to allow for better testing
of hypotheses like ours. For now, we are content with our model that does not include a lagged
variable, and we will rely on our theoretical framework for the relationship between foreign
aid and inequality to establish the definite possibility that foreign aid actually causes income
inequality to increase~ Nevertheless, the potential endogeneity problem may cause our estimators
to be incorrect.
Despite these myriad problems, we are confident that our model provides consistent,
best linear unbiased estimators to show how each of our independent variables affects
income inequality.
Results
The results of the analysis are found in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 contains the results of the
initial FGLS regressions, and Table 3 contains the results of the FGLS regression including
additional variables. We will first focus our discussion on the results in Table 2.
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Table 2: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Rela-tionship Be~een
_ _ ~reign Aid and In~ome In~quality_ (Omitting Agricultur~1 EmPloyment)_ _ _ _
Independent Variables

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Log GOP per capita (PPP)

2.9990···
(.6090)

2.9008···
(.5851)

2.7RR4···
(.5852)

Youth Population

.9596**·
(.0645)

(8g:~~'.-.-- - /~~~:~=~

.1202**·

.1239*·*

FDI percent of GOP

.

--------. --.-- ------------

I
1

I
.1

.1311**·

I,

I

____ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.:..(.0_4_2.:..1)_ _ _ _ _CO_40_4_)_ _ _ _(_.0_40_4_) _ _ __
Inflation (GOP Deflator)
.0059·**
.0051*··
.0048··
(.0017)
(.0016)
(JlO 16)
14.0200*·*
(2302)
------------.3516*··
Pol ity Democracy Scores
(.0883)

15.2084··*
(2.2276)

14.7894***
(2.2275)

.3251·**
(.0850)

1.2034
(.9248)

Log Foreign Aid

1.4414***
(.3401)

1.4225***
(.9248)

Ethnic Diversity

-------- ----

-----.

----

------

------------

.0749·
(.0452)

Polity X Log Foreign Aid
Constant

---16.1642··*
(5.4625)

-42.2893***
(8.0932)

-40.94772*·*
(8.0814)

R-Squared
N

0.684
211

0.709
211

0.7123
211

The dependent variahle is the logg.cd (jim CoclliClcnt. The \alues outsIde nfthe parenthesis arc the (ILS cslimatcs of the coefficIent"
The numhers Inside the parenthesis arc the standard errors. The prohahility 1. IS as follmvs: * 11'-.1, **=p',.05._*_**_-_r~_-(_Il_ _ _

-.J

The model presented in Table 2 attempts to replicate the results suggested by the literature.
All of the variables that are discussed in the literature review proved to be significant except
for agricultural employment. Because of its insignificance in initial estimations of all of the
models, we left out the agricultural employment variable in the final estimations. Model I
shows that all of the variables except for democracy are correlated with income inequality in the
hypothesized directions. GOP per capita, youth population, FOI as a percent of GOP, inflation,
and ethnic diversity all increase inequality. It is interesting to note, however, that democracy
is significantly positively correlated with inequality. This goes against the literature, which
establishes a nonexistent or negative relationship. Perhaps a ruling majority in a democracy
could use its power to repress a large minority, helping the majority and hurting the minority.
This could cause inequality to rise.
Model 2 adds the key independent variable, foreign aid, as an explanatory variable for
inequality. Again, all of the control variables, except democracy, are significant and correlated
in the hypothesized direction. As we hypothesized, the regression results also suggest that a
significant positive relationship exists between foreign aid and inequality. The null hypothesis
that there is no relationship between foreign aid and inequality can be rejected with over 99.9
percent confidence.
Model 3, the final model, also adds the interaction variable, testing for a magnified effect
of foreign aid on inequality in democracies. The regression results show that the interaction
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is positive, but only slightly significant. The null hypothesis that there is no additional effect
in democracies can be rejected with 90 percent confidence, not the 95 percent benchmark
we would like. However, the relationship is positive as the theory suggests. The final model
produced by the regressions is as follows:
Income inequality = -40.95 + 2.78(Ln(GDP per capita)) + 0.86(youth pop) + 0.13(FDI) +
0.0048(injlation) + 14.80(ethnic) - 1.20(democracy) + 1.42(Ln(aid))+ .07(aid*democracy)+ E
It is important to note that the results of these regressions have proven robust to several
different tests. The foreign aid variable remained positive and significant when using GLS
fixed effects models, GLS random etTects models, FGLS models, OLS models controlling
for year and country, and models including more independent variables which proved
insignificant. We also ran regressions using a dataset that contained values imputed using the
statistical program Amelia to determine whether or not the results would be robust to a large
increase in the sample size. The dataset, including the imputed values, had about 360 cases
and produced similar results for the etTect of foreign aid on inequality, proving the robustness
of the results. We concluded that the two additional variables, foreign aid and the interaction
variable, added significant explanatory power by running a Chow test. The test suggested that
the two variables were important.
To provide further interpretation of the results, we will examine the coefficients for the
variables. In the final model, the coefficient for foreign aid is 1.4225. Because the foreign
aid variable is a logged variable, this coefficient can be interpreted to mean that a 1 percent
increase in aid flows causes a 1.4225 point increase on the Gini index, a substantively
significant relationship. Because the Gini coefficient is a slow-moving variable, an increase
of 1.42 points is large. This relationship is especially significant after observing that many
activists are currently calling for a doubling of aid, or a 100 percent increase. Our results
suggest that an increase of this magnitude would cause income inequality to increase rapidly.
Further significance of the aid variables may be determined by examining the r-squared
values of each of the regressions. The r-squared value of the initial model (without the aid
variables) was 0.684, suggesting that 68.4 percent of the variance in income inequality can
be explained by the control variables. This is a large portion of the variance and suggests that
the original model explained much of the change. The r-squared value for the final model
was 0.712, suggesting that the aid variables explained an additional 3 percent of the variance
in inequality. This may seem like a small increase, but because the goal of this study was to
determine whether or not aid explained any of the variance in inequality, and not to determine
a list of causes of inequality, a 3 percent increase is significant. As mentioned earlier, a Chow
test was also used to determine that the aid variables were important to the model.
Another way to determine the explanatory power of the final model is to examine some of
the predictions the model made. We ran a regression with the last two cases (Venezuela 2001,
2002) omitted and then predicted the Gini values for those two cases. The model predicted that
the 200 I value would be 47.96 and the 2002 value would be 45.02. The actual values for these
two years were 46.39 and 47.52 respectively. These predictions were fairly accurate; however,
the model seems to be inconsistent at either over predicting or under predicting. This could be
a problem, but comparing the predicted values to the actual values on the chart below (Figure
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I) shows that the model predicts the Gini coefficient on a fairly consistent basis. Because o
this, we assume that the forecasting ability of the model is relatively strong. These variable
do an excellent job of explaining variance in income inequality.
Figure I: Predicted Values vs. Actual Values
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In Table 3, we include the agricultural share of GDP and literacy as additional control
variables and also add multiple lagged foreign aid variables. We will discuss the purpose of
these lagged variables below; the reasoning for including the agriculture and literacy variables
is found above.
The first model found in Table 3 presents the control variables we extracted from the
literature. Some differences exist between this model and the previous models. One of the major
differences is the direction of the relationship between GDP per capita and inequality. In these
models, the direction appears negative; previously the relationship appeared positive. Perhaps
this difference exists because of the ambiguity of the relationship between GDP and inequality.
Because the relationship changes as GDP increases, it is hard to tell the nature of the actual
relationship in a normal regression. The significance of the variable also seems to fluctuate from
regression to regression. The other variables remain significant in this first model.
The addition of the literacy and agricultural share of GDP variables provided some
interesting findings. The model suggests that higher literacy rates actually lead to higher
inequality. It is possible that literacy is an indicator of education, and when education is higher,
more inequality exists. This relationship could be explained by the idea that higher education
leads to a higher variation in jobs, with a higher variation in income from those jobs. Higher
education may also lead to a larger job market, which increases competition among the workers
and decreases wages. The other interesting finding presented in this model is the idea that as the

agricultural share ofGDP increases, ine'luali.ty decreases. This is different from the hy?othesized
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Table 3: Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) Regressions of the Relationship Between
Foreign Aid and Income Inequality (Omitting Agricultural Employment)
Independent Variables
I

Model I

Model 2

Model 3

Agricultural Share ofGDP
~.6534***
-.54S9***
-.4680***
______________ ~_ .._ _ ~9__'.)__~________,(,_.1_2_86__,_)__~_____,_(._13_6_7"_)~_
Log GDP per capita (PPP)
-2.3232**
-1.852*
-1.0661
_ _ .~_LI~_~~~
(1.072)
(1.1452)
Youth Population
1.2302***
1.176***
1.1351 ***
(.0928)
(~Og88)
(~0937)
Literacy

.1688***
(.0632)

FDI share ofGDP

~0638*

.0896**
(.0399)
.0047***
.0041 ***
(.001-'5)_______'_(._00_1_5,-)___
8~697***
9.474***
(2.406)
(2~518)

(~0388)

.0052***
(.0016)
8.194***
(2.508)

Ethnic Diversity

.2099***
(.0633)

~0727**

~__________~_~__ ~_<:0404)

Inflation (GDP Deflator)

.2217***
(.0618)

.4420***
.4032***
-1.347*
(.0839--"-)______--"-(._08_0_9)'---_____--"(._92_2_1'---)_ _
1.419***
1.2236***
(.3269)
(.4776)

Democracy
Foreign Aid (logged)
Foreign Aid (lagged I yr)

3.15e-IO
(4.88e-IO

Foreign Aid (lagged 2 yrs)

U\8e-IO
(4.55e-IO)
.0857**
(.0447)

Aid X Democracy
~---~--

~-.

~--

..- -

----.--~~--------------------'---------

Constant

13.0719*
(11.6177)

-24.1305**
(14.049)

R-Squared
N

0.727
210

0.749
.734
201
210
---------------------

-26.374**
( 15.0213)

rhe dependent \ariahk is the logged (jim coefficient. The valuc~ outside urthe parenthesis an; the GLS estimates of the coefficietlts.
The numher~ inSIde the parenthesIs arc the standard t:ITors. Thc probability /.. i~ a~ follows: * =p<.I, ** .p~ .05, *** --.ep_<_O_1____~

positive relationship. It could be that the agricultural share ofGDP increases as fanners begin to
become more efficient and better at fanning. [fthis is the casc, the incomes of fanners should bc
increasing and inequality should be dccreasing. This finding does fall in line with the findings of
Crenshaw (1992). The logic behind these relationships is not incredibly solid, but the findings
are quite interesting.
Model 2 adds our foreign aid variable. The relationship observed in thc models from
Table 2 is observed again in this tablc. After controlling for literacy and the agricultural share
of GDP, both significant explanatory variables for inequality, foreign aid remains highly
significant. The cocfficient for foreign aid also remains about equal to the coefficients found
in the models discussed above. This suggests that a highly substantive relationship exists
between forcign aid and inequality and that this rclationship is robust to changes in the model
and sample sizc.
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We also ran one final regression to test for the time effects of aid on inequality. Pieces of
our causal logic require time for aid to actually increase inequality, so we created two lagged
foreign aid variables. The first variable is a lag of one year, and the second variable is a lag
of two years. We included both lags in our final model, which produced some interesting
findings. Neither ofthe lagged variables was significant when controlling for the current year's
aid. However, further tests showed that both of the lagged variables had significant effects on
inequality on their own, not controlling for the current year's aid. Because of this. there is still
some ambiguity surrounding the relationship between foreign aid and inequality. The results
have two possible implications. The first is that aid has a real effect on inequality. but that
effect is instantaneous; it does not occur over time. The second is that the relationship between
aid and inequality is endogenous; inequality could cause aid organizations to give more aid.
Because both of these relationships are possible, it is diff1cult to make solid conclusions about
the relationship from these tests. Further research must be done. including more observations
and further tests, in order to reveal the true relationship between aid and inequality. However.
even if the relationship is occurring in the other direction (inequality causing aid), this is a new
and significant finding. Nobody has ever suggested that aid organizations are concerned with
inequality. Through this selection process, aid organizations may be looking for countries that
have worse inequality so they can usc aid to decrease that inequality and, therefore. improve the
conditions for economic growth. This would be a positive impact of the selection process.
The insignificant nature of the lagged variables is still quite interesting, however. If
aid has no effect on inequality over time, it is failing with respect to its goal of decreasing
inequality. Aid is either helping nobody or it is helping the rich and the poor rather than just
the poor. This finding has implications somewhat similar to the implications that come from a
positive relationship between aid and inequality. Aid is not doing what it is meant to do. and
this may impact some donors' willingness to give.

Implications and Conclusions
The analysis of this data supports our theoretical framework suggesting that foreign aid
increases income inequality in developing and transition nations. The quantitative tests show
that foreign aid is a robust explanatory variable for increases in inequality in these nations.
While the limited sample of countries precludes us from generalizing our results to all nations
across the globe. the varying characteristics of the countries studied allow for some conclusions
to be made. It must be remembered, however. that our sample included no African countries,
meaning that these results cannot be applied to African nations. Nevertheless, our datasets do
include multiple countries from Eastern Europe, Asia, South America, and Central America,
making it possible to generalize our results to those areas.
The quantitative analysis suggests that the effect of foreign aid on income inequality is
statistically and substantively significant. After controlling for all the other factors, increases
in foreign aid are related with limited increases in inequality. It must be remembered, however,
that foreign aid is intended to increase the well being of the poor alone. Most aid-giving
organizations obtain contributions and operate under the goal of decreasing world poverty.
Thus, our finding that foreign aid has a small but statistically significant effect on inequality
is important. We have found that while aid may help the poor, it is obviously helping the rich
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more, which is a problem. Most contributors to organizations that provide aid assume their
money is used for the poor. While there is a chance that these donors would still be satisfied
if they knew a small portion of their money helped the rich, they would probably not be
satisfied knowing that their money increases the incomes of the rich more than the incomes
of the poor, an implication of our findings.
While the etTect of foreign aid on income inequality may be small, it exists, and it
causes inequality to increase in these developing countries where inequality is already a
problem. Inequality causes slowed growth, higher crime rates, and other serious problems
across the world. One goal of foreign aid is to decrease this inequality and provide better
lives for the poor. This goal is not being met; even worse, the opposite is occurring. Foreign
aid causes inequality to increase.
Foreign aid money is given to these countries every year in amounts equaling
millions and sometimes billions of dollars. If those amounts are causing a small increase
in inequality every year, after ten or fifteen years, inequality will be much higher than it is
today. This will cause the growth that foreign aid is meant to encourage to slow or stop and
extreme hardship for many of the citizens of these developing countries, while providing
unnecessary luxuries for a select few.
We do not mean to suggest that aid organizations should cease giving aid. We do suggest,
however, that the way in which aid is given to these developing countries improve. It is obvious
from our results that foreign aid is not decreasing inequality but increasing it. Because of
this, aid organizations should reevaluate their methods for giving foreign aid. Careful analysis
should be performed using the newly released Project-level Aid Database (PLAID) to determine
which types of aid cause increases in inequality and which types of aid cause decreases. Aid
organizations should then focus their etTorts on providing aid through those which decrease
inequality. The PLAID database provides scholars and aid workers with a comprehensive
database of aid loans and grants classified by project type. This data could be used to determine
each type of aid project's etTects on inequality. We suggest that aid organizations intensifY their
level of responsibility and use their money to improve the conditions and the incomes of the
poor more than the rich. If reducing inequality, one of the key goals of foreign aid, is not met,
the way in which aid is distributed should be changed.
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